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Abstract
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-puriﬁability of mixed strategies in
the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so
that in each period, a player receives a private payoﬀ shock which is independently
and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the puriﬁa-
bility of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki
(2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitor-
ing. We ﬁnd that any such strategy proﬁle is not the limit of one-period memory
equilibrium strategy proﬁles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distribu-
tions. However, if we allow inﬁnite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then
any completely-mixed equilibrium is puriﬁable. Keywords: Puriﬁcation, belief-free
equilibria, repeated games. JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
Harsanyi’s (1973) puriﬁcation theorem is one of the most compelling justiﬁcations for
the study of mixed equilibria in ﬁnite normal form games. Under this justiﬁcation,
the complete-information normal form game is viewed as the limit of a sequence of
incomplete-information games, where each player’s payoﬀs are subject to private shocks.
Harsanyi proved that every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the original game is the
limit of equilibria of close-by games with incomplete information. Moreover, in the
incomplete-information games, players have essentially strict best replies, and so will
∗Mailath is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation under grants #SES-0095768
and #SES-0350969. Morris is grateful for support from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation,




§Princeton Universitynot randomize. Consequently, a mixed strategy equilibrium can be viewed as a pure
strategy equilibrium of any close-by game of incomplete information. Harsanyi’s (1973)
argument exploits the regularity (a property stronger than local uniqueness) of equilibria
of “almost all” normal form games. As long as payoﬀ shocks generate small changes in
the system of equations characterizing equilibrium, the regularity of equilibria ensures
that the perturbed game has an equilibrium close to any equilibrium of the unperturbed
game.1
Very little work has examined puriﬁcation in dynamic games. Even in ﬁnite extensive
games, generic local uniqueness of equilibria may be lost when we build in natural
economic features into the game, such as imperfect observability of moves and time
separability of payoﬀs. Bhaskar (2000) has shown these features may lead to a failure of
local uniqueness and puriﬁcation: For a generic choice of payoﬀs, there is a continuum
of mixed strategy equilibria, none of which are the limit of the pure strategy equilibria
of a game with payoﬀ perturbations.
For inﬁnitely repeated games, the bootstrapping nature of the system of equations
describing many of the inﬁnite horizon equilibria is conducive to a failure of local unique-
ness of equilibria. We study a class of symmetric one-period memory mixed strategy
equilibria used by Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’
dilemma with private monitoring. This class fails local uniqueness quite dramatically:
there is a two dimensional manifold of equilibria.
Our motivation for studying the puriﬁability of this class of strategies comes from
the recent literature on repeated games with private monitoring. Equilibrium incentive
constraints in games with private monitoring are diﬃcult to verify because calculating
best replies typically requires understanding the nature of players’ beliefs about the
private histories of other players. Piccione (2002) showed that by introducing just the
right amount of mixing in every period, a player’s best replies can be made independent
of his beliefs, and thus beliefs become irrelevant (and so the equilibrium is belief-free,
see remark 1).2 This means in particular that these equilibria of the perfect monitoring
game trivially extend to the game with private monitoring. Piccione’s (2002) strategies
depend on the inﬁnite history of play. Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) showed that it suﬃces
to consider simple strategies which condition only upon one period memory of both
players’ actions. These strategies again make a player indiﬀerent between his actions
regardless of the action taken by the other player, and thus a player’s incentives do not
change with his beliefs. Kandori and Obara (2006) also use such strategies to obtain
1See Govindan, Reny, and Robson (2003) for a modern exposition and generalization of Harsanyi
(1973). A brief introduction can also be found in Morris (forthcoming).
2This was not the ﬁrst use of randomization in repeated games with private monitoring. A number
of papers construct nontrivial equilibria using initial randomizations to instead generate uncertainty
over which the players can then update(Bhaskar and Obara (2002), Bhaskar and van Damme (2002),
and Sekiguchi (1997)).
2stronger eﬃciency results via private strategies in repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring.
At ﬁrst glance, the equilibria of Piccione (2002) and Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) involve
unreasonable randomizations: in some cases, a player is required to randomize diﬀerently
after two histories, even though the player has identical beliefs over the continuation
play of the opponent.3 Moreover, the randomizations involve a delicate intertemporal
trade-oﬀ. While there are many ways of modeling payoﬀ shocks in a dynamic game,
these shocks should not violate the structure of dynamic game. In repeated games, a
reasonable constraint is that the payoﬀs shocks should be independently and identically
distributed over time, and moreover, the period t shock should only be realized at the
beginning of period t. Our question is: Do the delicate intertemporal trade-oﬀs survive
these independently and identically distributed shocks?
Our results show that, in the repeated game with perfect monitoring, none of the
Ely-V¨ alim¨ aki equilibria can be puriﬁed by one-period memory strategies. But they can
be puriﬁed by inﬁnite horizon strategies, i.e., strategies that are no simpler than those
of Piccione (2002). We have not resolved the question of whether they can be puriﬁed
by strategies with ﬁnite memory greater than one.
However, while equilibria of the unperturbed perfect monitoring game are automati-
cally equilibria of the unperturbed private monitoring game, our puriﬁcation arguments
do not automatically extend to the private monitoring case. We conjecture—but have
not been able to prove—that in the repeated game with private monitoring all the Ely-
V¨ alim¨ aki equilibria will be not be puriﬁable with ﬁnite history strategies but will be
puriﬁable with inﬁnite history strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we review the completely mixed
equilibria of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma introduced by Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002).
The negative puriﬁcation result for one-period history strategies is in Section 4. In Sec-
tion 5, we present the positive puriﬁcation result for inﬁnite history strategies. Finally,
in Section 6, we brieﬂy discuss possible extensions and the private monitoring case.
2. An Introductory Example
Before discussing the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, we present a simpler game (in which
only one of the players is long-lived) to introduce belief-free equilibria and the issues
3This can occur when the incentive to play the stage game dominant action is independent of the




Figure 1: The product-choice game. Player 1, the row player, is long-lived, while the
other player is short-lived.
underlying their puriﬁcation.4,5
2.1. The unperturbed game
The stage game is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. We think of the row player (who is long-lived)
as a ﬁrm choosing between high (H) and low (L) eﬀort and the column player (who is
short-lived) as a customer choosing between a high (h) or low (`) priced product. Since
L is strictly dominant in the stage game, L` is its unique Nash equilibrium.
In the repeated game, the long-lived player has discount factor δ. In each period
there is a new column player who (being short-lived) myopically optimizes. The game
has perfect monitoring: in period t, both the long-lived player and the the short-lived
player (or, more speciﬁcally, the short-lived player of period t) know the history of play
ht ∈ ({H,L} × {h,`})t.
Since the long-lived player has a myopic incentive to play L, intertemporal incentives
are needed to induce the long-lived player to play H. For example, as long as δ > 1/2,
the trigger proﬁle using Nash reversion is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the long-
lived player is induced to play H (with a corresponding choice of h by the short-lived
player) by the threat that a deviation to L triggers permanent play of the myopic Nash
equilibrium L`.6 This speciﬁcation of behavior is an example of histories coordinating
continuation play: The continuation play after any history in which the long-lived player
has always played H is described by the trigger proﬁle, while continuation play after
every other history is described by permanent myopic Nash.
Our interest is in a diﬀerent class of equilibrium, called belief-free. These equilibria
are of particular importance in the study of private monitoring games (see remark 1).
In this class, the long-lived player randomizes uniformly over {H,L} in each period
independently of history. This randomization makes the short-lived player indiﬀerent
4The example is also special in that the incentive of the long-lived player to play H in the stage game
is independent of the behavior of the short-lived player (see footnote 7). Our analysis of the prisoners’
dilemma does not have this feature.
5Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Section 7.6) illustrate equilibrium constructions with long-lived and
short-lived players using this example.
6Note that the short-lived player is always playing a myopic best reply.
4between h and ` in each period, allowing us to specify behavior for the short-lived player
providing intertemporal incentives for the long-lived player. Let pa1 be the probability
the short-lived player puts on h after the long-lived player’s play of a1 ∈ {H,L} in the
previous period.7 Let V
p
1 (a1) be the long-lived player’s expected value from the action
a1, when the short-lived player plays h with probability p. Then,
V
p











1 (H) + 1
2V
p0
1 (L) (recall that the long-lived player is randomizing uni-
formly over {H,L}). In order to be willing to randomize, the long-lived player must be
indiﬀerent between H and L, and so V
p
1 (H) = V
p
1 (L) = V p for p = pH,pL.8 Equating







Setting p = pH in (1), and p = pL in (2), and solving gives
V pH
= 2pH and V pL
= 1 + 2pL, (4)
and so (3) and (4) implies




For δ > 1/2, we thus have a one-dimensional manifold of one-period memory equilibria
indexed by pH ∈ [1/(2δ), 1], with pL determined by (5). There is an additional (minor)
indeterminacy arising from the lack of restrictions on the short-lived player behavior in
the initial period; without loss of generality we assume that the short-lived player plays
pH in the initial period.
Remark 1 (Private Monitoring and Belief-Free Proﬁles Equilibria) A similar
construction yields an equilibrium in games with private monitoring. Suppose actions
are private, and each player observes a noisy private signal ˆ ai of the other player’s action
ai at the end of the period. Suppose the signals are independent, conditional on the
7If the long-lived player’s incentive in the stage game to play H depended on the behavior of the
short-lived player, the short-lived player’s randomization depends on the previous period’s realized
actions of both players.
8This implies V
p
1 (H) = V
p
1 (L) = V
p for all p ∈ [0,1].
5action proﬁle. We assume that the short-lived player of period t knows the history of
private signals observed by earlier short-lived players. The payoﬀs in Figure 1 are now
ex ante stage game payoﬀs, derived from an underlying ex post stage game game, where
player i’s payoﬀ is a function of i’s action and private signal realization only (so that i’s
payoﬀ conveys no additional information beyond that conveyed by i’s private signal).
Since there are no public histories to coordinate play and the monitoring is condi-
tionally independent, H choices cannot be supported using trigger strategies. However,
when the signals about the long-lived player’s actions are suﬃciently accurate, there are
one-period memory proﬁles in which the long-lived player plays H in every period with
positive probability.
Just as in the game with perfect monitoring, the long-lived player randomizes uni-
formly over {H,L} in each period independently of history. This randomization again
makes the short-lived player indiﬀerent between h and ` in each period, allowing us
to specify behavior for the short-lived player providing intertemporal incentives for the
long-lived player. Similar calculations to (1) through (5) show that there is again a one-
dimensional manifold of equilibria (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, section 12.5): After
observing the signal ˆ a1, the short-lived player chooses h with probability pˆ a1 so that
p





where η > 0 is the noise in the monitoring,
η = Pr(ˆ L | Ha2) = Pr( ˆ H | La2) and 1 − η = Pr( ˆ H | Ha2) = Pr(ˆ L | La2).
These randomizations are chosen so that the long-lived player is indiﬀerent between
H and L, irrespective of the private history that 2 had observed. This implies that
the optimality of the long-lived player’s behavior can be veriﬁed without calculating
the long-lived player’s beliefs about the short-lived player’s continuation play. For this
reason, such equilibria are called belief-free (Ely, H¨ orner, and Olszewski, 2005).

In belief-free equilibria the short-lived player, while always indiﬀerent over her ac-
tions, randomizes diﬀerently after diﬀerent histories (a property shared by the belief-free
equilibria described in remark 1). Since the long-lived player is randomizing uniformly
over {H,L} independently of history, the short-lived player’s beliefs over the play of the
long-lived player are independent of these diﬀerent histories.
2.2. The perturbed game
We now investigate the extent to which the requisite randomizations in the belief-
free equilibria can be “justiﬁed” as the limit of essentially strict equilibria of close-by
6h `
H 2,3 0,2 + ε2z2
t
L 3 + ε1z1
t,0 1 + ε1z1
t,1 + ε2z2
t
Figure 2: The (ε1,ε2)-perturbed product-choice game.
incomplete information games. In other words, are such equilibria Harsanyi (1973)-
puriﬁable? In keeping with the spirit of repeated games, we perturb the stage game,
as illustrated in Figure 2. Player i’s payoﬀ shock zi
t is private to i, realized in period
t. We assume zi
t is independent across players and histories, and (for simplicity in
this section) uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The inﬁnitely-repeated perfect monitoring
game with stage game displayed in ﬁgure 2 is denoted Υ(ε1,ε2) ≡ Υ(ε). In particular,
the set of t-period histories in Υ(ε) is again given by ({H,L} × {h,`})t, so that past
actions are perfectly monitored, while payoﬀs shocks remain private. By construction,
in any period, if ε2 > 0, for almost all realizations of the payoﬀ shock, the short-lived
player cannot be indiﬀerent between h and ` (with a similar comment applying to the
long-lived player).
An equilibrium of Υ(ε) is γ-close to the belief-free equilibrium indexed by pH if
for all i and all histories ending in a1 ∈ {H,L}, the ex ante probability (i.e., taking
expectations over the current payoﬀ shock) of the long-lived player playing H is within
γ of 1/2, and the ex ante probability of the short-lived player playing h is within γ of
pa1. A belief-free equilibrium is puriﬁed if for all γ > 0 there exist ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0
such that there is a γ-close equilibrium of Υ(ε1,ε2).
2.2.1. Perturbing only the short-lived player, ε1 = 0.
When ε2 > 0, the short-lived player’s best reply to any long-lived player behavior is, for
almost all realizations of zt
2, unique. Moreover, the best reply is history independent
when the long-lived player’s behavior is also history independent. Since the provision
of intertemporal incentives to the long-lived player in a belief-free equilibrium requires
history dependent play by short-lived players, any equilibrium of Υ(0,ε2) close to that
belief-free equilibrium must feature history dependent play by the long-lived player.
Nonetheless, constructing an equilibrium of Υ(0,ε2) close to any belief-free equilibrium
is straightforward: Fix a belief-free equilibrium indexed by pH (with pL given by (5)).
Since the long-lived player’s payoﬀs are not perturbed, his incentives are preserved by
setting the ex ante probabilities of h equal to those in the belief-free equilibrium, while
the behavior of the long-lived player is chosen to “rationalize” the behavior of the short-
lived players. Speciﬁcally, let a1 ∈ {H,L} denote the long-lived player’s action in the
7previous period. The ex ante probability the short-lived player plays h is given by
Pr(h) = pa1. Since
Pr(h) = Pr(z2
t ≤ ˆ z2
a1) = ˆ z2
a1,
where ˆ z2
t is the short-lived player type indiﬀerent between h and `, we set ˆ z2
a1 = pa1.
The long-lived player plays H with probability π
a1
1 to make ˆ z2




1 × 3 = π
a1
1 × 2 + (1 − π
a1










Note that, as ε2 → 0, the ex ante probability of H after a1 in the previous period, π
a1
1 ,
converges to 1/2, as required.
2.2.2. Perturbing only the long-lived player, ε2 = 0.
Turning to the other extreme, we now suppose ε1 > 0 and ε2 = 0. Since the short-lived
players’ payoﬀs are not perturbed, short-lived players are only willing to play history
dependent strategies if the ex ante probability the long-lived player plays H is 1/2,
implying the marginal type is 1/2.
Fix a belief-free equilibrium indexed by pH and let a1 ∈ {H,L} denote the long-lived
player’s action in the previous period. Let Wε(a1) be the long-lived player’s expected
discounted value from following the strategy of playing H if z1
t ≤ 1/2 and L if z1
t > 1/2
from this period (since z1






















2 is the probability the short-lived player puts on h (after observing a1 from
the previous period). Simplifying.
















Wε(H) − Wε(L) = 2(1 − δ)(πH
2 − πL
2 ). (7)








2 + 1 + ε1z1
t) + δWε(L).
Since the type z1
t = 1/2 must be indiﬀerent between H and L,
(1 − δ)2π
a1
2 + δWε(H) = (1 − δ)(2π
a1
2 + 1 + ε1/2) + δWε(L),
that is
δ(Wε(H) − Wε(L)) = (1 − δ)(1 + ε1/2). (8)







which for small ε1 is close to (5).
2.2.3. Perturbing both players, ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0.
Key to the construction of the purifying equilibrium of Υ(0,ε2) is the lack of long-lived
player perturbations, so that ex ante probabilities satisfying (5) made the long-lived
player indiﬀerent between H and L after any history. Key to the construction of the
purifying equilibrium of Υ(ε1,0) is that the unperturbed short-lived player must face
the history-independent randomization 1
2 ◦H + 1
2 ◦L in order to be willing to randomize
(in a history dependent manner).
The diﬃculty with purifying belief-free equilibria arises from the interaction between
the problem of providing incentives for two players. Fix ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0, and consider
a candidate equilibrium in which in period t, the long-lived player puts probability π
a1
1
on H and the short-lived player puts probability π
a1
2 on h, where a1 ∈ {H,L} is the
long-lived player’s action in period t − 1. As before, ˆ zi
a1 = π
a1
i is the marginal type for
each player. The reasoning in subsection 2.2.1 still applies, and so in order for ˆ z2
a1 to be















2 , this implies πH
1 6= πL
1 . On the other hand, the reasoning in subsection
2.2.2 still applies, and so in order for ˆ z1
a1 to be indiﬀerent we need, from (8),
δ(Wε(H) − Wε(L)) = (1 − δ)(1 + ε1ˆ z1




C 1,1 −`,1 + g
D 1 + g,−` 0,0
Figure 3: The unperturbed prisoners’ dilemma stage game.
which cannot be satisﬁed for distinct values πH
1 6= πL
1 . Hence, belief-free equilibria
cannot be puriﬁed by strategies that depend only on the long-lived player’s last period
action. An analysis similar to that in section 4 shows that allowing each player’s behavior
to depend on both players’ last period action does not change this conclusion.
3. The Inﬁnitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Let Γ(0) denote the inﬁnitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma with stage
game displayed in ﬁgure 3. Each player has a discount rate δ. The class of mixed
strategy equilibria Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) construct can be described as follows: The
proﬁles have one-period memory, with players randomizing in each period with player
i assigning probability pi
aa0 to C after the action proﬁle aiaj = aa0, where j = 3 − i.
As in the previous section, the proﬁle is constructed so that after each action proﬁle,
the player is indiﬀerent between C and D. Consequently, a player’s best replies are
independent of his beliefs about the opponent’s history. The requirement that after
aiaj = aa0, player i is indiﬀerent between playing C and D when player j is playing
p
j
a0a yields the following system (where Wi
aa0 is the value to player i after aa0, and the
second equality in each displayed equation comes from the indiﬀerence requirement):
Wi
aa0 = (1 − δ)(p
j














= (1 − δ)p
j






















− (1 − δ)` + δ(Wi
CD − Wi
DD).
Since at least two of the probabilities diﬀer (if not, p
j
aa0 = 0 for all aa0), the coeﬃcient
of p
j




















These two equations succinctly capture the tradeoﬀs facing potentially randomizing
players. Suppose a player knew his partner was going to play D this period. The myopic
incentive to also play D is `, while the cost of doing so is that his continuation value
falls from Wi
CD to Wi
DD. Equation (11) says that these two should exactly balance.
Suppose instead the player knew his partner was going to play C this period. The
myopic incentive to playing D is now g, while the cost of playing D is now that his
continuation value falls from Wi
CC to Wi
DC. This time it is equation (12) that says that
these two should exactly balance. Notice that these two equations imply that a player’s
best replies are independent of the current realized behavior of the opponent.9
A proﬁle described by the four probabilities (pi
aa0 : aa0 ∈ {C,D}2) for each player
i ∈ {1,2} is an equilibrium when (9) and (10) are satisﬁed for the four action proﬁles
aa0 ∈ {C,D}2, and for i = 1,2. Since the value functions are determined by the
probabilities, the four probabilities are free parameters, subject only to (11) and (12).
This redundancy implies a two-dimensional indeterminacy in the solutions for each of
the players, and it is convenient to parameterize the solutions by Wi
CC and Wi
CD.




(1 − δ)` + Wi
CC − δWi
CD








(1 − δ)` + Wi
CD − δWi
CD








(1 − δ)(` − g/δ) + Wi
CC − δWi
CD








(1 − δ)`(1 − 1/δ) + Wi
CD − δWi
CD




9This is the starting point of Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), who work directly with the values to a player
of having his opponent play C and D this period.
11As in the introductory example (see footnote 7), if the myopic incentive to play the dom-
inant action is independent of the opponent’s play, i.e., g = `, there is a particularly
simple belief-free proﬁle. By setting Wi
CC = Wi
CD, we obtain a proﬁle where j’s ran-




Da for all a ∈ {C,D}. In such
an equilibrium, after any two histories ending in CC and in CD, player 1 randomizes
diﬀerently even though player 2’s continuation play is the same.
We have described an equilibrium if the expressions in (13)-(16) are probabilities.
Theorem 1 There is a four-dimensional manifold of mixed equilibria of the inﬁnitely-
repeated perfect monitoring prisoners’ dilemma: Suppose 0 < Wi
CD ≤ Wi
CC ≤ 1 satisfy
the inequalities
(1 − δ)g/δ + δWi
CD ≤ (1 − δ)` + Wi
CC (17)
and (1 − δ)` ≤ δWi
CD. (18)
The proﬁle in which player i plays C with probability pi
aa0 after aiaj = aa0 in the previous
period (and plays pi
˜ a˜ a0 in the ﬁrst period, for any ˜ a,˜ a0 ∈ {C,D}), where pi
aa0 for all
a,a0 ∈ {C,D}2 are given by (13)-(16), is an equilibrium. Moreover, (17) and (18) are
satisﬁed for any 0 < Wi
CD < Wi
CC ≤ 1, for δ suﬃciently close to 1.
Proof. We need only verify that (17) and (18) imply that the quantities described

















CC ≤ 1. Observe ﬁrst





CC ≤ 1, since Wi
CC ≤ 1.
We also have p
j
CD ≥ 0, since
(1 − δ)(` − g/δ) + Wi
CC − δWi
CD ≥ 0
⇐⇒ (1 − δ)` + Wi





DD ≥ 0 is equivalent to (18).
For each speciﬁcation of behavior in the ﬁrst period, there is a four-dimensional
manifold of equilibria. Our analysis applies to all of these manifolds, and for simplicity,
we focus on the proﬁles where players play pi
CC in the ﬁrst period.
4. One Period Memory Puriﬁcation
We now argue that it is impossible to purify equilibria of the type described in Section
3 for generic distributions of the payoﬀ shocks using equilibria of the perturbed game
with one period history dependence.
12C D
C 1 + εz1
t,1 + εz2
t −` + εz1
t,1 + g
D 1 + g,−` + εz2
t 0,0
Figure 4: The perturbed prisoners’ dilemma stage game.
Let Γ(ε) denote the inﬁnitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma with
stage game displayed in ﬁgure 4. The payoﬀ shock zi
t is private to player i, realized
in period t, independently and identically distributed across players, and histories, ac-
cording to the distribution function F(.). The distribution function has support [0,1],
and a density bounded away from zero. Let F be the collection such distribution func-
tions endowed with the weak topology. A property is generic if the set of distribution
functions for which it holds is open and dense in F.
An equilibrium of Γ(ε) is γ-close to p (an equilibrium of the form described in
theorem 1), if for all i and all a,a0 ∈ {C,D}, for all histories ending in aa0, the ex ante
probability (i.e., taking expectations over the current payoﬀ shock) of player i playing
C is within γ of pi
aa0. An equilibrium p is puriﬁed for the distribution F if, for all γ > 0
there exists ε > 0 such that there is an equilibrium of Γ(ε) is γ-close to p.
Theorem 2 Let p be a completely mixed strategy equilibrium of the form described in
theorem 1. Generically in the space of payoﬀ shock distributions, there exists γ > 0
such that for all ε > 0, there is no equilibrium of Γ(ε) with one period memory within
γ distance of p.
Proof. Fix γ0 = min{pi
aa0}/2. Any proﬁle within γ0 of p is completely mixed. We
show by contradiction that there are no one period memory equilibria in Γ(ε) that are
γ close to p, for γ suﬃciently small.
Fix a one period memory equilibrium of Γ(ε) that is γ-close to the equilibrium p of
Γ(0), where γ < γ0. Denote the ex ante probability of player i playing C after observing
the action proﬁle aa0 by πiε
aa0. Player i will play C in period t if and only if the payoﬀ
shock zi








1 − F(ˆ zi
aa0) for some marginal type ˆ zi
aa0. If zt
i ≥ ˆ zi
aa0 then i plays C, and plays D
otherwise. Since πiε
aa0 ∈ (0,1), we have ˆ zi
aa0 ∈ (0,1) for every action proﬁle aa0 and for
i ∈ {1,2}.
The marginal type ˆ ziε
aa0 is indiﬀerent between C and D when the action proﬁle played
in the last period is aa0. Let Wiε
aa0 denote the ex ante value function of a player at the
action proﬁle aa0, before the realization of his payoﬀ shock. The interim payoﬀ from C
























while the payoﬀ to i from D after the proﬁle aa0 is
V iε
aa0(zi























a0a − (1 − π
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= (1 − δ)π
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Note that the right hand side of (20) is linear in π
jε
a0a, player j’s mixing probability. Let
αiε and βiε denote the intercept and slope of this linear function; these do not depend
upon the proﬁle aa0. We may therefore re-write (20) as
F−1(1 − πiε
aa0) = αiε + βiεπ
jε
a0a. (21)









: a,a0 ∈ {C,D}
o
must be collinear, for i ∈ {1,2}.









: a,a0 ∈ {C,D}
o




a0a| < γ for all j ∈ {1,2} and
a,a0 ∈ {C,D}, the points in Zε
i will also not be collinear. But this would contradict
(21) and so the existence of the putative equilibrium.
10Note that the bound on γ, while depending on F, is independent of ε.
14Consider ﬁrst the case where, for some player i, p speciﬁes three distinct mixing
probabilities. In that case, it is clear that for generic F, the points in the set Z0
i are
not collinear and we have the contradiction.
Consider now the case when p has only two distinct values of pi
aa0 for all i. From (14)
and (16), pi
DC > pi
DD, while from (13) and (16), we deduce pi
CC > pi
DD. Thus the only





















































The points in Z0
i clearly cannot be collinear, and we again have a contradiction.
The theorem asserts that for any ﬁxed mixed strategy equilibrium p, there does
not exist a one period puriﬁcation for generic shock distributions. While we assume
that each player receives payoﬀ shocks from the same distribution, the same argument
goes through with asymmetric payoﬀ distributions. The theorem does not rule out
the possibility that, for generic shock distributions, there will be some mixed strategy
equilibrium p (depending on the shock distribution) that is puriﬁed with one-period
memory strategies.
In an earlier version of this work, Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2004), as well as
in the introductory example of section 2, we studied the (non-generic) case of uniform
noise. Uniform noise is special because F−1 is linear. In this case, some symmetric
strategies were puriﬁable but all others were not.
Remark 2 (Stronger Impossibility Results) In Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2004),
we had asserted that the type of argument reported here would extend to ﬁnite memory
strategy proﬁles of any length. Unfortunately, the argument we gave was invalid, and
while the assertion might be true, we have been unsuccessful in obtaining a proof.
Stronger impossibility results for the puriﬁability of belief free strategies can be ob-
tained if the stage game is one of perfect information. Bhaskar (1998) analyzes Samuel-
son’s overlapping generations transfer game and shows that ﬁnite memory implies that
no transfers can be sustained in any puriﬁable equilibrium. We conjecture that this
result extends to any repeated game, where the stage game is one of perfect information
and players are restricted to ﬁnite memory strategies. In any puriﬁable equilibrium,
the backwards induction outcome of the stage game must be played in every period.
Simultaneous moves, as in the present paper, allow for greater possibilities of puriﬁ-
cation: some belief free strategies are puriﬁable via one period memory strategies for
non-generic payoﬀ shock distributions. More importantly, the induction argument ex-
tending the negative one period result to arbitrary ﬁnite memory strategies is not valid
in the simultaneous move case.
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5. Puriﬁcation with Inﬁnite Memory
We now argue that, when we allow the equilibrium of the perturbed game to have
inﬁnite history dependence, then it is possible to purify belief-free equilibria of the type
described in Section 3. To simplify notation, we focus on symmetric equilibria, so that
paa0 is the probability player 1 plays C after the proﬁle aa0 (with player 2 playing C
with probability pa0a). Fix an equilibrium with interior probabilities, pCC, pCD, pDC,
and pDD ∈ (0,1).
We ﬁrst partition the set of histories, H, into equivalence classes, denoted by (aa0,k),
aa0 ∈ {C,D}2 and k ≥ 0. The equivalence class (aa0,0) with aa0 6= CC consists of all
histories whose last action proﬁle is aa0. The equivalence class (aa0,k) with aa0 6= CC
and k ≥ 1 consists of all histories whose last action proﬁle is CC and there were k
occurrences of CC after the last non-CC action proﬁle aa0. Finally, the equivalence
class (CC,k) is a singleton, containing the k-period history in which CC has been
played in every period. Note that the null history is (CC,0), and that any history is an
element of the partition (aa0,k), where the history ends in CC if k ≥ 1.
The purifying strategy in the perturbed game is measurable with respect to the
partition on H just described. Fix ε > 0 and let πε
aa0(k) denote the probability with
which C is played when h ∈ (aa0,k), and let Wε
aa0(k) denote the ex ante value function





is a sequence (as ε → 0) of equilibria purifying
p = (pCC,pCD,pDC,pDD), then πε
aa0(k) → pCC for all k ≥ 1 and all aa0, and pε
aa0(0) →
paa0, as ε → 0. We show a uniform form of puriﬁability: the bound on ε required to
make πε
aa0(k) close to pCC is independent of k.
The idea is that in the perturbed game, the payoﬀ after a history ending in CC can
always be adjusted to ensure that the appropriate realization of z in the previous period
is the marginal type to obtain the desired randomization between C and D. We proceed
recursively, ﬁxing probabilities after any history in an element of the partition (aa0,0)
at their unperturbed levels, i.e., we set πε
aa0(0) = paa0. In particular, players randomize
in the ﬁrst period with probability pCC on C, and in the second period after a realized
action proﬁle aa0 6= CC with probability paa0 on C.11 This turns out to determine the
value function at histories in (aa0,0) for all aa0. In the second period after CC, Wiε
CC(1)
is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability that a player play C in
the ﬁrst period is given by πε
CC(0) = pCC. Given the value Wε
CC(1), the probability
πε
CC(1) is then determined by the requirement that Wε
CC(1) be the ex ante value at the
history CC. More generally, given a history h ∈ (aa0,k) and a further realization of
11More precisely, player 1 randomizes with probability paa0 and player 2 randomizes with probability
pa0a.
16CC, Wε
aa0(k + 1) is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability that a
player play C in the previous period is given by πε
aa0(k) = paa0, and then πε
aa0(k + 1) is
then determined by Wε
aa0(k + 1).
Denote by V ε
aa0(k;zt,ˆ a) the interim payoﬀ from ˆ a, given the payoﬀ realization zt,
after a history falling into the equivalence class (aa0,k) (and assuming continuation




aa0(k;zt,C) = (1 − δ){πε









aa0(k;zt,D) = (1 − δ)πε
a0a(k)(1 + g) + δ {πε
a0a(k)Wε




aa0(k) is the probability of C at a history in (aa0,k), the player with any payoﬀ
realization zt ≥ ˆ z ≡ F−1[1−πε
aa0(k)] chooses C, and D otherwise. Moreover, the player
with payoﬀ realization ˆ z must be indiﬀerent between C and D, i.e.,
V ε




aa0(k;zt,C) = V ε
aa0(k; ˆ z,C) + (1 − δ)ε(zt − ˆ z),
and since V ε
aa0(k;zt,D) ≡ V ε
aa0(k;D) is independent of zt, we have (using (23))
Wε
aa0(k) =V ε
aa0(k;D) + (1 − δ)ε
Z 1
ˆ z
(z − ˆ z)dF(z)
=V ε
aa0(k;D) + (1 − δ)εG(πε
aa0(k)),
where G(π) is the ex ante expected incremental value of the payoﬀ shock to this player




x − F−1(1 − π)dF(x).
Beginning with histories in (aa0,0), we have
Wε
CD = (1 − δ){pDC(1 + g) + εG(pCD)} + δ {pDCWε
DC + (1 − pDC)Wε
DD}, (24)
Wε
DC = (1 − δ){pCD(1 + g) + εG(pDC)} + δ {pCDWε
DC + (1 − pCD)Wε
DD}, (25)
Wε
DD = (1 − δ){pDD(1 + g) + εG(pDD)} + δ {pDDWε




aa0(k) = (1 − δ){πε




DC + (1 − πε
a0a(k))Wε
DD}. (27)




Moreover, these solutions converge to WCD, WDC, and WDD. It remains to determine
Wε
aa0(k) and πε
aa0(k) for k ≥ 1 (Wε
CC(0) is also determined, since πε
CC(0) = pCC).
Solving (23) at a history in (aa0,k − 1) for Wε
a0a(k) as a function of πε
aa0(k − 1) and
πε
a0a(k − 1) gives
Wε
a0a(k) =







(1 − δ){` − εF−1[1 − πε






This can be re-written (using (11)) as
Wε
a0a(k) =








CD) − (WDD − Wε





Examining (29), we see that the terms in the ﬁrst line converge to WCC as ε → 0.
Since the numerator of the second line vanishes as ε → 0, this implies that Wε
a0a(k) →
WCC provided that πε
aa0(k − 1) is bounded away from zero.
Given a value for Wε
aa0(k),12 (27) can be re-written as
(1 − δ)εG(πε
aa0(k)) + bεπε
aa0(k) + cε(k) = 0, (30)
where







At ε = 0, equation (30) admits a solution π0
aa0(k) that is independent of k and equals
−c0
b0 = pCC. We need to establish that πε
aa0(k) converges to pCC for all k ≥ 1, uniformly
in k.
12From (29), while W
ε
aa0(k) is determined by π
ε
aa0(k − 1), it is independent of π
ε
aa0(k).
18Theorem 3 Let p = (pCC,pCD,pDC,pDD) be a symmetric completely mixed one period
memory equilibrium of the form described in theorem 1. For all η > 0, there is exists
ε(η) > 0 such that for all ε < ε(η), the equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(ε) given by
the probabilities πε
aa0(k) described above satisﬁes
|πε
aa0(k) − pCC| < η ∀k ≥ 1.
Proof. First observe that there exists ξ > 0 such that
|Wε
aa0 − Waa0| ≤ ξε (33)
for all aa0 6= CC. This follows from the fact that there is a unique solution to equations
(24), (25), and (26) when ε = 0.
Now we establish inductively that for any η > 0 there exists ε(η), not depending on
k, such that ε ≤ ε(η) and
 πε
aa0(k − 1) − pCC
  ≤ η for all aa0 imply
 πε
aa0(k) − pCC
  ≤ η




aa0(k − 1) − pCC

 ≤ η. Observe that setting ε = 0 in (29), we have
WCC =
(1 − δ)(g − `)
δ
+ WDC + WCD − WDD.
Subtracting this equation from (29), we have
Wε
a0a(k) − WCC = (Wε
DC − WDC) + (Wε




CD) − (WDD − Wε





From (17) and (18), δ/(1 − δ) ≥ g and so
|Wε







Now setting ε = 0 in equation (30), we have that (recall that pCC = π0
aa0(k) for all k)
b0pCC + c0(k) = 0.
Subtracting this equation from equation (30), we have
(1 − δ)εG(πε
aa0(k)) + bε(πε




19|cε(k) − c0(k)| ≤ δ |Wε
DD − WDD| + |Wε
aa0(k) − WCC|, by (32),
|bε − b0| ≤ 2δεξ, by (31) and (33),
and bε ≥ (1 − δ)(1 + g) + δ(WDC − WDD) − 2εδξ, by (31) and (33).
Furthermore, (1 − δ)(1 + g) + δ(WDC − WDD) > 0 since it is equal to the denominator
in equation (13), so that bε > 0 for ε suﬃciently small. Consequently,
|πε
aa0(k) − pCC| ≤
1
bε
((1 − δ)ε + |bε − b0|pCC
+δ |Wε
DD − WDD| + |Wε
aa0(k) − WCC|)
≤
(1 − δ)ε + 2δεξpCC + δεξ + ε(3ξ +
2ξ+1/g
pCC−η)
(1 − δ)(1 + g) + δ(WDC − WDD) − 2δεξ
,
The last expression is less than or equal to η if




≤ η((1 − δ)(1 + g) + δ(WDC − WDD) − 2δεξ)
or
ε ≤
η(1 − δ)(1 + g) + δ(WDC − WDD)




and the theorem is proved.
6. Discussion
To understand the question of the puriﬁability of mixed strategy equilibria in inﬁnite
horizon games, we work with one elegant class of one-period history strategies. Here
we have a striking result: with inﬁnite history strategies, such strategies are puriﬁable.
But if we restrict ourselves to one-period history strategies in the perturbed game,
then no such strategy is puriﬁable (for a generic choice of noise distribution). While
we conjecture that this negative result extends to allowing all ﬁnite-memory strategy
proﬁles in the perturbed game, we have not been able to solve this case.
As noted in the introduction, much of the interest in the puriﬁability of mixed
strategy equilibria in repeated games comes from the literature on repeated game with
private monitoring. The systems of equations for the perfect monitoring case can be
straightforwardly extended to allow for private monitoring. Unfortunately, the par-
ticular arguments that we report exploit the perfect monitoring structure to reduce
20the inﬁnite system of equations to simple diﬀerence equations, and somewhat diﬀerent
arguments are required to deal with private monitoring.
We conjecture that the inﬁnite horizon puriﬁcation results would extend using gen-
eral methods for analyzing inﬁnite systems of equations. Intuitively, private monitoring
will make puriﬁcation by ﬁnite history strategies harder, as there will be many diﬀerent
histories that will presumably give rise to diﬀerent equilibrium beliefs that must lead
to identical mixed strategies being played, and this should not typically occur. This
argument can be formalized for one period histories, but we have not established the
argument for arbitrary ﬁnite history strategies. However, we believe that the ﬁnite his-
tory restriction may place substantial bounds on the set of mixed strategies that can be
puriﬁed in general repeated games, and we hope to pursue this issue in later work.
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